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1
2

P R O C E E D I N G S
November 9, 2016

2:04 P.M.

3

THE CLERK:

4

versus Twitter, Incorporated.

5
6
7

MR. ARISOHN:

9

MR. CAROME:

12

Josh Arisohn of Bursor and Fisher on

behalf of the plaintiffs.
THE COURT:

11

Calling Civil Matter 16-213, Fields

Counsel, please come forward and state your appearance.

8

10

2

Good afternoon, your Honor.

Good afternoon.
Good afternoon, your Honor.

Patrick

Carome on behalf of defendant Twitter.
THE COURT:

Good afternoon.

So, Mr. Arisohn, I have -- you're not going to be

13

surprised -- the same problems that I've had before with your

14

complaint.

15

The provision of -- I think I dealt with each of these

16

issues in my prior order.

17

accounts theory is distinguishable from publishing activity as

18

I found before, and it's protected by Section 230(c) of the

19

Communications Decency Act.

20

I don't see that the provision of

I think the decision to furnish an account will prohibit

21

one from using one's inherently publishing activity and I think

22

the causation issue is still dispositive.

23

So, and I don't think the direct messaging theory works,

24

again, for the same reasons.

25

private communications beyond simply defamation.

I think Section 230(c)(1) reaches
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1

And I -- you know, I feel for your clients.

3

And it's a

2

tragic situation and ISIS is a horrible terrorist group, but

3

that doesn't mean that Twitter was responsible for the death of

4

Mr. Fields or Mr. Creach.

5

So that's my view.

I will have two questions.

One, I

6

will let you explain to me why the second amended complaint is

7

different than the first.

8

you have -- assuming that I don't change my mind on the

9

tentative, are you ready to take this up or do you need another

But my second question will be:

10

amendment to perfect your appeal?

11

MR. ARISOHN:

12

Do

Thank you, your Honor.

I understand your position.

I understand I have an uphill

13

battle here, but with your position I would like to go through

14

the arguments and see where they go.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. ARISOHN:

Go ahead.
We carefully studied the Court's order

17

on the last motion to dismiss and considered them carefully in

18

drafting the second amended complaint and I think we

19

incorporated a lot of those thoughts and addressed the Court's

20

concerns as best we could, particularly in the way that we

21

organized the complaint to show the ways in which we were and

22

were not relying on content here.

23

So the first point is that the cause of action here falls

24

under 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), which creates a private right of

25

action for violations of the Anti Terrorism Act, material
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1

support provisions.

2

(b), both of which, with different language, prohibit the

3

provision of material support to terrorists.

4

4

And the ones alleged here are 2339(a) and

And that is the gist of our allegations here; that Twitter

5

violated these material support provisions when it gave ISIS

6

Twitter accounts.

7

now sets it out more clearly, that those material support

8

provisions were violated when the accounts were handed to ISIS,

9

not when ISIS issued Tweets or content from those accounts.

And the way we have organized the complaint

10

And the sections of the complaint setting out the violations of

11

those material support statutes, in fact, now don't refer to

12

content in any way, shape or form.

13

And so the question becomes:

Is providing ISIS with a

14

Twitter account in and of itself -- and not being tethered to

15

content, can that be considered a publishing activity?

16

you look at what the Ninth Circuit has said and how it has

17

defined "publishing activity" in the Barnes decision, it

18

described it as, "reviewing, editing or deciding whether to

19

publish or withdraw content."

20

And if

Providing someone with a Twitter account doesn't implicate

21

any of those activities.

22

is a different activity from deciding whether ISIS should be

23

permitted to Tweet out specific content.

24

account is providing someone with a tool.

25

neutral decision.

Providing ISIS with a Twitter account

It's -- providing an
It's a content
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1

5

If you hand someone a typewriter, that's not a

2

content-based publishing activity.

3

they can do with that typewriter and write and disseminate with

4

that typewriter, it becomes content based.

5

here are only on the provision of the tool in the first place.

6

If you start deciding what

Our allegations

And the case that Twitter has relied on here, and I know

7

the Court has cited it, is the BackPage.com case.

8

if you really look at what was going on in that case, BackPage

9

is distinguishable because the allegations at issue in that

But I think

10

case were tethered to specific content at the core of the

11

allegations in a way that our case is not.

12

In the BackPage case, BackPage was providing classifieds

13

for escorts on its website and the plaintiff said, their

14

allegation was that BackPage had constructed its website in a

15

way that it aided sex traffickers.

16

But what they were really saying was that they constructed

17

their website in a way that they were making content-based

18

decisions in the construction of their website.

19

allegations there were that the defendant -- was that the

20

defendant designed its website so that sex traffickers could

21

hide sensitive information, including their phone numbers, and

22

they allowed emails to be anonymized, and photos were stripped

23

of metadata, and payments could be made anonymously.

24
25

And so the key

And so the allegation was that making construction
decisions about the website that went specifically to this
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1

content was at the heart of the issue.

2

content-based decisions, even if they were made through the

3

prism of a website construction.

4

So these were

And so BackPage doesn't stand for the proposition that

5

just giving someone an account on a website is publishing

6

activity.

7

that if you construct a website in a way to tailor content,

8

that that's the same as making a content-based publishing

9

decision and that's not what we're -- that's not what we're

10

6

It stands for something much more narrow, which is

alleging here.

11

I think such a ruling would extend the CDA far beyond

12

where any Court has taken it to date.

13

Court should be wary of doing that because the Ninth Circuit

14

has now warned on several occasions that Courts should not

15

extend the CDA beyond the narrow scope that Congress set out.

16

And I think that the

Now, as to how we are using content, it is limited to one

17

area of our claim and that is to show proximate causation.

18

I think if you look at Ninth Circuit precedent, in particular

19

the Barnes and the Internet Brands decisions, those cases stand

20

for the proposition that if you are relying on content just to

21

show causation as part of proving or alleging the causal chain,

22

that that by itself does not implicate the protections of the

23

CDA.

24
25

And so in Barnes that was the case, where the
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. ARISOHN:

I remember.
And based on Yahoo's failure to remove

3

an offensive profile that was posted by the plaintiff's

4

ex-boyfriend.

5

7

So the theory of liability there was based on Yahoo's

6

promise to remove the profile and plaintiff's reliance.

7

the claim, nevertheless, had to refer on published content

8

because she had to show that the failure to remove the profile

9

injured her because the contents in that profile was offensive

10

and having it out there in the wider world caused her injury.

11

The Ninth Circuit allowed her claim to go forward despite

12

reliance on this content as part of the causal chain and held

13

that the CDA didn't apply.

14

And

And it was the same thing in the Internet Brands case.

15

That was the failure to warn case where plaintiff alleged that

16

the defendant's website knew that rapists were using its

17

website to lure victims.

18

a special relationship, foreseeable harm and failure to warn a

19

potential victim.

20

And there the theory of liability was

And, again, the claim required reference to content that

21

was on the website, but the claim was allowed to go forward

22

because the reference to the content was limited to the causal

23

analysis.

24

contact the plaintiffs because their information was available

25

on the website.

They had to show that the rapists were only able to

And the Ninth Circuit said that that alone is
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8

1

not sufficient for the CDA to apply because publishing activity

2

is the but-for cause of just about everything that these

3

internet companies do.

4

So, in other words, just because publishing activity is

5

referenced, solely referenced to the causal analysis, that

6

doesn't mean that the CDA applies.

7

And I would say that the same thing is what's happening

8

here.

9

that Twitter knowingly provided Twitter accounts to ISIS, and

Ms. Fields and Ms. Creach and their family are alleging

10

that's the basis of their claim.

11

contents of Tweets to show that ISIS used these accounts to

12

gain finances and recruits for themselves so they could go out

13

and perpetrate attacks like the one in which Mr. Fields and

14

Mr. Creach were killed.

15

THE COURT:

And they are only referencing

Even though Abu Zaid, there was no

16

evidence that he ever used Twitter, that ISIS ever said

17

anything with respect to this particular event, and there are

18

no facts alleging that the attack was in any way aided by

19

ISIS's social media presence.

20
21
22

MR. ARISOHN:

Well, I'll turn to proximate causation,

because that seems to be what you're getting to.
So the key thing for proximate causation under the Anti

23

Terrorism Act is that there is no directness requirement.

24

is the opinion that's being expressed by numerous Courts.

25

That

So you don't have to trace material support to a specific
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9

1

attack.

2

worked on myself, if you show that material support was

3

provided to a terrorist organization and then that terrorist

4

organization separately perpetrated an attack, that is

5

sufficient.

6

support, whether it's financial or otherwise, is fungible.

7

It's enough, in case after case, many cases that I've

And the reason behind that is that material

And so as Judge Posner noted in one of his decisions under

8

the ATA, even if a contribution is not used directly by a

9

terrorist organization, it can be used indirectly because it

10

opens up funds elsewhere within the organization.

11

fungibility of material support means that there is no

12

directness requirement.

13

provided the support to the terrorist organization and that the

14

terrorist organization committed the attack.

15

And so the

All you have to show is that you

And we have done that here.

I think we've shown that

16

Twitter provided material support to ISIS.

17

very valuable and it helped them raise funds and recruit

18

people.

19

to open up that helped them carry out this attack.

20

These accounts were

And then that allowed funds to open up and resources

And we've adequately alleged that ISIS was responsible for

21

this attack.

22

Zaid, was a member of an ISIS cell, and we refer to two claims

23

of responsibility by ISIS.

24

require more in terms of how to properly allege proximate

25

causation.

We cite to evidence that the perpetrator, Abu

I don't think we could possibly
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10

1

And, you know, the CDA part of the argument, I think

2

that's, you know, new ground to a certain extent, but this --

3

these proximate causation allegations fall squarely within

4

where other cases have gone.

5

proximate causation hasn't been adequately alleged here would

6

fall far outside the mainstream of where other Courts have gone

7

in that.

8

THE COURT:

9

And I think a ruling that

All right.

Mr. Carome.

10

MR. CAROME:

Thank you, your Honor.

11

Twitter certainly shares the Court's view that what

12

happened to the plaintiffs here is ghastly, horrible and that

13

ISIS is horrible.

14

Obviously, what this case is about is whether a liability

15

could be extended all the way to Twitter for its having simply

16

done for -- allegedly for some number of people associated with

17

ISIS what it has done for hundreds of millions of other people

18

around the world, simply providing them with a service open to

19

all.

20
21
22

I don't think that plaintiff has made any new arguments.
I think this is essentially a motion for reconsideration.
The reorganization of the complaint is really completely

23

irrelevant to the provision of accounts theory, which is the

24

theory he's relying on.

25

Also, many Courts repeatedly, including the Ninth Circuit,
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11

1

have said that Section 230 immunity depends on the inherent

2

nature of the claim, not on how it's cosmetically pled, not on

3

artful pleading or creative pleading, not on the labels you put

4

on your claim or on the sections of the complaint.

5

all that is different here.

6

And that is

Moreover, by having a section of his complaint that

7

says -- labeled "Proximate Cause" that is replete with all

8

of -- virtually all of the allegations about the content that

9

were there before had really just confirmed that this is a

10

complaint that is based on the content, both in terms of the

11

nature of the claim -- we wouldn't be having a case at all if

12

it were not for -- if members of ISIS or associates of ISIS had

13

opened accounts and done nothing with them.

14

only here today solely based on claims as to how those accounts

15

were used.

16

Obviously, we're

And simply, you know, proximate cause is an essential

17

element of the Section 2333(a) claim.

18

down.

19

about, really, a claim that Twitter failed to block content

20

appearing on the service.

And they have doubled

I mean, they have relied fully on content.

This is all

21

This is really -- and as your Honor has noted in your

22

August 10th decision, there -- the decisions about who may open

23

or keep a Twitter account are themselves decisions about what

24

content may appear.

25

things.

There is no way to distinguish those two
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1

In fact, the opening of a Twitter account itself is

2

content.

3

screen name that I've created.

4

account -- you can't separate out the opening of a Twitter

5

account from the publishing of content.

6

12

It is a message that, you know, follow me with this
You cannot open a Twitter

The new allegation about Mr. Zaid, Abu Zaid allegedly

7

having been part of an ISIS sleeper cell back when he was in

8

college at some indefinite period of time doesn't change

9

anything in terms of any connection between Twitter and what

10

Twitter did and -- and the attack, the horrible attack in

11

Jordan.

12

And, in fact -- and this is really directed perhaps more

13

to proximate cause than to anything else.

14

August 10th opinion, spelled out that the only arguable

15

connection alleged in the first amended complaint, the prior

16

complaint between Abu Zaid and Twitter, was an allegation about

17

his brother, Abu Zaid's brother, having commented to someone

18

that Mr. Zaid had been inspired by some other ISIS atrocity

19

involving the killing of a Jordanian pilot.

20

Your Honor, in your

And why was that even an arguable connection?

At least

21

there was an allegation in the prior complaint, the first

22

amended complaint, that that killing of the Jordanian pilot had

23

somehow been Tweeted about or publicized, among other ways,

24

through Twitter.

25

So there was at least there in the prior complaint some
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13

1

hyper-attenuated attempt to draw some possible connection.

2

That allegation is completely gone.

3

as the only arguable connection between Abu Zaid and Twitter

4

and that was extraordinarily breathtakingly attenuated.

5

The Court referred to that

And so, in fact, I would say that while the sleeper cell

6

allegation perhaps

7

some connection between Mr. Zaid and ISIS, it has absolutely

8

nothing to do in terms of any connection whatsoever between

9

Twitter or Tweets on Twitter and the horrible attack in Jordan.

10

might suggest some possible basis to assume

I have not heard Mr. Arisohn say anything about a further

11

amendment.

12

three bites at the apple.

13

version of this complaint three times.

14

substantive change whatsoever.

I think that that's appropriate.

He has now had

We have now had to move to dismiss a
There has been no

15

It is clear that however he attempts to label his theory,

16

it is a theory that seeks to hold Twitter liable for decisions

17

relating to go what content flows through its service.

18

only way he could possibly ever -- he doesn't even try now any

19

more.

20

to Twitter to the attack in Jordan would be through the content

21

of Tweets, which he still alleges.

22

And the

The only way he could possibly ever tie anything related

And so I think in light of -- particularly in light of

23

Section 230 and its strong policy to avoid imposition on

24

internet platforms of -- protracted and the burdens of

25

litigation, it is now time to end the proceeding here in the
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14

1

District Court.

2

it to the Ninth Circuit, perfectly fine, but I think we've come

3

to an end here in this court.

4

THE COURT:

5

All right.

Mr. Arisohn, last words.

6
7

And if Mr. Arisohn, his clients want to take

MR. ARISOHN:

If I could just address a few of those

points.

8

So, first, Mr. Carome said that -- you know, that the

9

argument about limiting content to proximate causation can't

10

win because proximate causation is an essential element under

11

the ATA.

12

Barnes and it was true in Internet Brands.

13

think that that argument can really win the day.

14

But the same is true in every case.

It was true in

And so I don't

And then in terms of opening an account being the creation

15

of content itself, I just don't think that's true.

16

plenty of people who sign up for Twitter accounts and they

17

don't post a picture and they never issue a Tweet.

18

that comes out of their account, it might never come.

19

it come out, it's a separate decision whether to allow that or

20

not.

21

There are

Any content
And if

In terms of the connection for proximate causation, if

22

Twitter had given ISIS a billion dollars in cash and then ISIS

23

went out and committed an attack, they could make the same

24

argument:

25

attack.

Well, we haven't connected what they did to the
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1

15

And just because we're not talking about cash here, we're

2

talking about a powerful communications tool, it's not really

3

any different.

4

communications tool and that freed up resources for them and it

5

helped them garner new resources to carry out many more

6

terrorist attacks.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

They gave a terrorist organization a

And can I just address the direct messaging issue quickly,
your Honor?
THE COURT:

Yes.

Maybe I cut you off before, so go

ahead and do that.
MR. ARISOHN:

That's okay.

We have addressed this before, but I just want to
emphasize a few points here, if I can.
As you know, the CDA says that you can't treat an

15

interactive computer service as a publisher.

16

for us in trying to figure out what that means is that the

17

statute doesn't define what a "publisher" is.

And the problem

18

And so the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit has said

19

that if a statutory term is not defined, you need to use and

20

interpret the term according to its ordinary meaning.

21

you look up "publisher" in the dictionary, it says -- it's

22

defined as "one who disseminates information to the public."

23

And so a private message cannot be published material under

24

this definition.

25

And if

And the important thing to note here is that Congress
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1

easily could have defined the term.

2

statutes, including the ATA itself, that has a "Definition"

3

section and they define terms when they want them to mean

4

something other than their ordinary meaning.

5

how to do that.

6

bound by the ordinary meaning used in the statute, whether we

7

like it or not.

8
9

And so we're

And the Supreme Court said in -THE COURT:

And by the Ninth Circuit.

MR. ARISOHN:

11

THE COURT:

13

Congress knows

Congress did not do that here.

10

12

There are plenty of

I'm sorry?

And by the Ninth Circuit.

Like Barnes,

for example, which deals directly with that issue, doesn't it?
MR. ARISOHN:

I would say that to the extent that

14

Barnes applied a version of a definition of "publish" that was

15

different from the ordinary meaning, that that Court

16

respectfully was mistaken.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. ARISOHN:

19
20

And I shouldn't follow the Ninth Circuit?
Well, you might be obligated to, but it

might be something I have to bring up with them.
But, in any event, I think that might be limited to

21

defamation cases because it might make sense, given the history

22

and the purpose of the CDA, to use a definition of "publish" in

23

defamation cases when you're dealing with a defamation case.

24

But I think it's hard to imagine -- it's hard to -- and

25

rationalize using the defamation definition of "publish" when
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1
2

17

you're dealing with a terrorism case.
And because the statute says what it says and it has this

3

term that's not defined, we have to follow what the Supreme

4

Court has said time and time again, which is that:

5

"Courts must presume that a legislature says in

6

the statute what it means and means in the statute

7

what it says."

8

And, again, I'll go back to the fact that the Ninth

9

Circuit has warned against expanding the CDA beyond what's

10

in -- written there.

11

this is a quote:

12

Internet Brands specifically says, and

"Congress could have written the statute more

13

broadly, but it did not."

14

And so as written the CDA does not apply to private

15

communications and so it can apply the direct messages here.

16

And just a few more points and then I will --

17

THE COURT:

18

already made though.

19
20

Okay.

MR. ARISOHN:

Don't make any ones that you've

I will not.

In Twitter's reply they raised the issue of JASTA, Justice

21

Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act.

22

brief that, so this is new ground.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. ARISOHN:

25

We have not had a chance to

Okay.
And the defendant tries to argue that

because JASTA adds secondary liability to the ATA, that somehow
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1

changes the landscape of primary liability claims under the

2

material support provisions, like the one asserted here.

3

And I would just add that JASTA was intended to broaden

4

the ATA, not to narrow it.

5

any of the preexisting parts of the ATA.

6

happens, Courts say they presume that no changes to those

7

preexisting parts and the underlying case law was intended.

8
9

And it doesn't expressly address
And when that

And, indeed, the cosponsor of the bill, Senator Cornyn,
said that:

10

"While JASTA clarifies the rule for secondary

11

liability, it doesn't impact other aspects of the ATA

12

such as direct liability based on the material

13

support provisions."

14

In terms of amending, I don't think there is anything that

15

we could do at this point with regards to the CDA.

16

that's going to be a basis for dismissal, I'm happy to take

17

that to a higher court, if necessary.

So if

18

On the proximate causation standard, I believe that

19

because JASTA does add secondary liability, that does change

20

the landscape there somewhat because we could add additional

21

claims now based on either aiding and abetting or conspiracy,

22

which changes the analysis somewhat.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. ARISOHN:

25

THE COURT:

But not with respect to the CDA.
Correct.

All right.

Thank you both.
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1

inclined -- although I will issue a written order, I'm quite

2

inclined to stick with where I have been.

3

I think the second amended complaint restructures what you

4

had in the first amended complaint and I don't think it changes

5

the analysis, but I will take one more look at it.

6

And assuming that I do that and that I rest on the

7

Communications Decency Act, I take what you say as not wanting

8

to amend further and so I would probably do it without leave.

9

Okay.

10

MR. ARISOHN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CAROME:

13

MR. ARISOHN:

14

Understood.

Thank you both.
Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, your Honor.

(Proceedings adjourned.)
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